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This article proposes a methodological stance, an Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) of participants’ drawings as one that is 
useful for research into people’s experiences of seizure consciousness. Using 
empirical examples located in an original, larger study, this article offers a 
rationale for, and illustrates the analytic potential of, this combination. It also 
considers that elicitation interviewing techniques and methods from the field 
of neuro-phenomenology could take this work further in terms of deepening 
the analysis by reaching people’s pre-reflexive conscious experiences.  This 
theoretical and practical combination has the potential to develop this work 
significantly. Keywords: Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), 
Consciousness, Art Work, Seizures, Neuro Phenomenology, Elicitation 
interview techniques, Pre Reflective Experiences 
  
The focus in this paper on seizure consciousness in the context of an Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), is underpinned by the long standing clinical issue of 
differentiating epilepsy from non-epileptic seizures (NES), and not the result of abnormal 
brain activity and that these states are described very differently by people with both seizure 
types (Furchner, 2002). It is important to differentiate epilepsy from NES because both types 
of seizures require very different treatments and procedures, some epilepsy treatments being 
unnecessary, inappropriate and potentially dangerous for people with NES (Ali, Rickards, 
Bagary, Greenhill, McCorry, & Cavanna, 2010; LaFrance & Benbadis, 2006; LaFrance, 
Gates, & Trimble, 2008). Given that there is no single clinical (Avbersek & Sisodiya, 2010; 
Devinsky, Gazzola, & LaFrance, 2011) or historical feature that can pinpoint that seizures are 
not epileptic (Alsaadi & Marquez, 2005), this has opened up the arena for methods other than 
medical techniques to explore the differences.   
Research using Conversation Analysis (CA) for example, has gone far in identifying 
linguistic hints relating to either diagnosis and pinpointing further avenues to explore 
(Featherstone & Sandfield, 2013). This work has provided evidence that there are reliable 
differences between the way in which people with epilepsy and NES talk about their 
experiences of seizure consciousness (Furchner, 2002; Gülich & Schöndienst, 1999; Plug, 
Sharrack, & Reuber, 2008, 2009; Reuber & Plug, 2007). Seizure consciousness is thus the 
focus of this article and Reuber and Kurthen (2011) identified two linked concerns to work 
on further here. The first was to define what consciousness is for people with seizures 
because how people with seizures experience consciousness has not been fully explored in 
terms of its phenomenological quality and what, if any, higher cognitive processes a person is 
using (what Reuber and Kurthen termed, access consciousness). Present definitions of 
consciousness cannot adequately capture experiences or variations across subjective accounts 
(Engel, 2001); the International League of Epilepsy (ILEA) definition  not fully accounting 
for "alterations in the subjective content of ictal consciousness" (Cavanna et al., 2008, p. 
2  The Qualitative Report 2013 
184). In neurological settings if patients do not remember things, they are often perceived as 
having been unconscious and measurements of “behavioural, constituent functions of 
consciousness” along with descriptions by patients and observers may not represent the 
“vividness” of a phenomenological seizure experience (Cavanna et al., 2008, p. 185).  
Reuber and Kurthen‘s (2011) second concern is that given reflecting on consciousness 
is an introspective act (Vermersch, 2009) the “methodologically impossible” task of 
accessing this from ‘a third person perspective’ (Reuber & Kurthen, 2011, p. 102) constitutes 
a hurdle to undertaking this work. Because we cannot see directly into “other minds” (Reuber 
& Kurthen, 2011, p. 102) we can only try and make sense of another person making sense of 
a particular phenomenon-a double hermeneutic (Smith, 2011). A way in which to do this is to 
use a methodology that can access “first person experience of conscious states” (Moran, 
2000, p. 15) and which IPA aims to do. 
A related concern for us is that words for describing synesthetic sensations for 
example, are not in everyday parlance and the lack of such a discourse could further hinder 
our understandings of seizure experiences (Petitmengin, 2006). The “paucity of vocabulary 
for describing these subtle sensations” is considered a main stumbling block to gathering 
subjective descriptions (Petitmengin, Navarro, & Quyen, 2007, p. 751). Explicating these 
from a phenomenological stance therefore, could be advantageous.  
During the course of a larger exploratory IPA study I (VF) undertook, experiences of 
consciousness were verbally described in great detail by two participants with epilepsy 
diagnoses. These were supplemented with drawings by them. This paper describes the 
interpretation of this data and begins an exploration of the concerns above. The paper also 
suggests that using neuro-phenomenological elicitation interview techniques which aim to 
reach people’s pre-reflective conscious experiences could add to this exploration. Husserl’s 
existential, transcendental phenomenology challenged traditional science and third person 
accounts because it explained consciousness by examining its structures within a person  
(Moran, 2000). It is these structures neuro-phenomenological elicitation interview techniques 
access, data from which can be subsequently entered into a “pheno-dynamic analysis.” That 
is, the techniques can access the “pre-reflective micro-structure” of subjective processes 
which mirror the “dynamical structure of the neuro-electric activity of the brain” 
(Petitmengin et al., 2007, p. 746). Often data from neuro imaging are not enough in 
themselves, requiring verbal descriptions of how they were experienced in order for them to 
be interpreted fully (Petitmengin, 2006). Using a pheno-dynamic analysis, it becomes 
possible to combine and analyse neural (medical) information alongside subjective 
experiences (Petitmengin, 2006). This opens up the potential of phenomenological methods 
to be included in empirical studies on seizure consciousness. Given its integration into 
previous studies, a phenomenological attitude is the mode of access which could be 
operationalised in the context of seizure consciousness reassessing the terrain in which 
phenomenology can work.  Scientific knowledge can then by supported by adding in the roles 
of consciousness and subjectivity (Gallagher & Sørensen, 2006).   
 
Consciousness in Philosophy, Neurology and Psychology 
 
A philosophical understanding of consciousness considers people's subjective 
experiences and the phenomenal nature of that experience as they describe it. This experience 
consists of unifying experiences from various sensory modes into a new simultaneous 
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experience, existing as a state of consciousness in its own right—phenomenological 
consciousness (Tye, 2003). One way of thinking about whether someone is conscious or not, 
is to consider the various degrees to which a person is self-aware. A conscious mental state is 
one which is accompanied by what are termed higher order states—an individual considering 
some thought or being aware of their mood or a bodily sensation. This constitutes the self-
representational theory of consciousness—i.e., a conscious state is only that if they are aware 
of their own conscious state, external stimuli, their self and their awareness of those stimuli 
(Uriah & Williford, 2006). Another way of considering whether a person is conscious is to 
think of him/her being able to interact empathically with others in the social world at a given 
time (Thompson, 2003) even though they may be experiencing a constant flow of altering 
mental activity (Kalamangalam, 2001). However, someone could be conscious without any 
evidence of interacting empathically with others thus further clarification of such terms as, 
conscious,  unconscious, awareness, unawareness and impaired awareness for example 
(Johanson, Valli, Revonsuo, & Wedlund, 2008) could be useful.     
Psychology, neurology, and philosophy-often working in isolation from each other 
(Campion, 2009) - have differing conceptualisations and explanations of 
consciousness/awareness (Zappulla, 1997). People experiencing seizures also have expert 
knowledge of their seizures to impart (Tuckett, Boulton, Olsen, & Williams, 1985) and the 
wealth of expertise emerging from these different perspectives needs to be combined and 
realised (Depraz & Gallagher, 2002). Neurological data is becoming increasingly precise, 
requiring a semantic clearly linked to subjective experiences. Attention should be paid 
therefore, to what a person may be reflectively conscious of in this context (Vermersch, 
2009). The accounts herein offer perspectives on subjective experiences during neurological 
events and are relevant and timely. In terms of phenomenology and first person subjective 
descriptions, phenomenology attempts to reach the “truth” of the manner in which “things” 
appear to consciousness and before everyday common sense or scientific knowledge imposes 
on what is being explored. This can support, clarify, or reject scientific knowledge by adding 
in, and defending the need for, the roles of consciousness and subjectivity (Moran, 2000). 
Given that (a) subjective experiences and descriptions are fundamental to understanding 
consciousness and major factors in defining seizure types (LaFrance et al., 2008), and (b) that 
a phenomenological view is absent in this field, a method such as IPA holds promise (Moran, 
2000, p. 15) in explicating these.  
 
Methodology: Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
 
IPA is rooted in phenomenological thought its founding principles being “that 
experience should be examined in the way that it occurs and in its own terms” (Smith, 
Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p. 12). The notion of epileptic qualia--the “what it is like“ to 
experience a seizure (Monaco, Mula, & Cavanna, 2005, p. 155) is the level and quality of 
analysis an IPA aims to reach and the level adopted to explore the drawings herein. IPA’s 
main premise is that our body shapes our knowledge about the world, and these “physical and 
perceptual affordances of the body-in-the-world are significantly more important than 
abstract or logical ones” (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p. 19). Unlike CA, where the 
cognitions of conversation partners are peripheral to CA (te Molder & Potter, 2005), IPA  as 
a method has a major interest in cognition (Smith, 1996) and considers this a “science of 
meaning making” (Smith & Eatough, 2006, p. 325) accessible through language (Smith et al., 
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2009). A person's cognitive and affective reaction to a phenomenon and how they speak 
about their bodies relates to their thoughts and beliefs (Smith, Jarman, & Osborn, 1999). It is 
this “chain of connection between accounts, cognition and physical state” (Smith & Eatough, 
2006, p. 265) that is structured and organised, “open to being appropriated and understood by 
others” and can thus be considered scientific (Giorgi, 1995, p. 38). IPA's specific focus on 
individual (idiographic) embodied experiences, its stance on cognition and language and in 
depth individual interpretations offers an excellent theoretical and methodological ‘fit’ for 
exploring seizure patients’ experiences. These epistemological roots also lend themselves to 
developing the method further.   
 
“Doing” IPA 
 
The way in which an IPA is conducted has been well documented (Smith et al., 2009). 
The researcher begins by having one or more conversations with an individual in which 
he/she endeavours to gain an understanding of a phenomenon in question while also 
bracketing his/her pre-conceived ideas about it. Bracketing can be explained in mathematical 
terms, i.e., the pre suppositions of a phenomenologist are put aside and treated separately, as 
in a mathematical equation (Smith et al., 2009). However, when what we previously took for 
granted becomes a phenomenon to be studied more deeply, we need to balance what we 
already know about it and allow ourselves to discover and take into account what we did not 
know. Suspending this “natural attitude” edits out temporarily, our previous assumptions, 
concerns and engagement because we only attend “to what is given to us in intuition” with no 
prior scientific or philosophical hypothesis being present in our “new” vista essential features 
of the phenomena being truly isolated (Moran, 2000, p. 10). Suspending “all ontological 
judgements about the nature and essence of things and events” allows us to reach what is real 
to people (Holstein & Gubrium, 1998, p. 139). (Finlay, 2008, p. 8). Expanding Smith’s 
mathematical allegory, our previous understandings, which we initially put aside, are taken 
into account in light of what we have discovered anew and become part of our calculations or 
eventual interpretations.  
A second level of practice involves putting into operation the phenomenological 
attitude which is not an easy task (Finlay, 2008). There are arguments for training 
phenomenological researchers in spiritual methods which share Husserl’s epistemology 
emphasising “knowledge by presence”, (Louchakova, 2005, p. 87) in order to gain the skills 
necessary to do phenomenology (Berndtsson, Claesson, Friberg & Öhlén, 2007; Varela, 
1996). Because it is within the researcher that the interpretation lies, training for 
phenomenological researchers could, “enhance the capacity for knowledge” of a researcher 
and  “enhance direct intuition” (Louchakova, 2005, p. 87, 108). Asian philosophies are 
implicated here, being “living manifestations of an active, disciplined phenomenology,” they 
can be learned and can work to extend and complement science (Varela, 1996, p. 346).   
Undertaking an IPA “requires an ability to be reflective, insightful, sensitive to 
language, and constantly open to experience” (Van Manen, 1998, p. xi).  The most important 
thing being, “that the interpretation is inspired by, and arises” from participants' own words 
(Smith et al., 2009, p. 90). In addition to an academic endeavour, an IPA is a personal, 
creative and iterative process (Crist & Tanner, 2003) the researcher’s mind, knowledge and 
imagination being the analytic tool (Louchakova, 2005).Finlay’s suggestion of “managing 
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pre-understandings” (Finlay, 2008, p. 5) will also help us conceptualise phenomenon in terms 
of our own biographies, knowledge and “fore-understandings” (ibid, p. 8).        
Very small numbers of participants are advocated in IPA studies (Landridge, 2007), 
individual cases unfold’[ing] how “something is” - even traditional science studying “unique 
occurrences” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 30). The seminal work using CA mentioned above began 
with very few cases, accumulating to around 100 in total over a decade and, “it is not 
uncommon for the first studies in a new field to be descriptive in nature rather than being able 
to provide robust demonstrations of clinical effectiveness” (Malzfeldt, 2013, p. 377).   
 
Recruitment of Participants 
 
Around 1500 people are referred to the Hull neurology clinic each year. The 
consultant neurologist and his staff invited newly referred patients, including private patients 
and patients from an acute admissions setting, to take part in an interview study. This 
exercise was repeated six months later to maximise recruitment. Patients chosen for inclusion 
were those newly referred without a clear diagnosis, that is, they could have had epilepsy or 
NES or a combination of both. (New patients did not include those who had been referred on 
from other hospitals for example, for a second opinion). Patients excluded were those who 
were involved in court cases and patients with heart disease because seizures would be 
secondary to their heart disease. From around 15 Patient Information Leaflets/personal letters 
from me (VF) being distributed, four people expressed an interest in the study and agreed to 
take part including the possibility of taking part in two interviews 18 months apart, in order to 
gain a temporal view of their experiences. This appeared to be a hard to reach group because 
no further patients volunteered to take part in the study. The study had Ethics & Governance 
approval from Hull & East Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust. The data presented below is 
taken from two conversations I had with both Vince and Dave (pseudonyms) whose 
descriptions were rich and supplemented by drawings they did. They talked to me in the 
context of an unstructured research conversation telling their stories on their own “terms” 
(Haggman-Laitila, 1999, p. 15) and I implemented “… IPA’s inductive epistemology to its 
fullest extent” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 70). 
 
Previous Studies with the Art Work Of People with Epilepsy 
 
Previous empirical, neurologically related studies heralded the beginnings of 
differential diagnoses of seizures though an assessment of art work, in children (Kozma, 
1978: Stafstrom & Havlena, 2003) and in adults (Anschel, Dolce, Schwartzman & Fisher, 
2005). One on-going study 1 includes artwork which represents central experiences people 
with these conditions would like to be more fully understood. In particular, the need for them 
to be able to fill gaps in their consciousness upon emerging from  seizures was apparent. 
Another publication showcases over 200 pieces of art work, each created by a person with 
epilepsy, capturing insightful images about what it is like to have this condition (Schacter, 
2003). Art work from people with seizures has also been classified into themes which could 
1 Sparks of Creativity: The Influence of Epilepsy and Migraines in Art.  University of Melbourne.  
http://sparksofcreativity.blogspot.com/2008/08/artistic-expressions-influenced-by_18.html. Retrieved from 
Associated web site-Channel Z Artworks 
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further understandings of “underlying neurophysiological bases of ictal (seizure) postictal and 
interictal experiences” (Schachter, 2009, p. 14) including psychiatric morbidity and the 
psychosocial aspects of the condition. People have depicted visual symptoms (not apparent to 
others) which can mirror the “anatomic localisation of the seizure focus and/or the network 
activated by the seizure which offers a window into brain-behaviour relationships and 
neuroethology” (Schachter, 2009, p. 13), others drawing images depicting out-of-body 
experiences. Postictal states, involving feeling a loss of contact with reality and distorted 
visual perceptual, have also been represented as has the process of regaining consciousness. 
There remains the potential to further interpret visual representations of people experiencing 
seizures into “testable hypotheses” (ibid, p. 14). Drawings then have been used in 
neurologically related studies and we consider that there is the potential for systematic 
methods to elicit a scientific, deep analysis of people’s experiences in this context.  
 
The Potential of Using Patient Drawings in IPA 
 
I (VF) took drawing materials along with me to the interviews in case participants 
found talking about their experiences difficult or if conversations faltered. When I asked 
participants if they wanted to draw their experiences, Vince and Dave, did so, the other 
participants declined. Vince drew one single figure and Dave several. Although the inclusion 
of participants' drawings is not common in IPA, and this could be considered a definite 
departure from the method, the drawings by participants in this study, although unexpected, 
deserved attention (Bell, 2006). They depicted unusual physical experiences which offered 
some insights into relationships between subjective experiences and external environments 
(Johanson et al., 2008).     
Creating and engaging with participants’ drawings can empower them and researchers 
to present their stories in different ways. They can uncover interpretations which may have 
been missed otherwise and/or offer a different view of a phenomenon (Glass, 2008). Using 
similar non-linguistic forms of data has been used to try and gain descriptions which bypass 
conventional ways of making sense of things, they can be useful for further discussion and if 
people are not verbally articulate (Gillies et al., 2005). The art work below has left visual 
traces of Vince and Dave’s lived experiences “transformed into transcended configurations” 
(Van Manen 1998, p. 74). 
 
Case 1. Vince 
 
Vince, at around 60 years of age had experienced around seven seizures in a fifteen 
month period, and commenced taking anti-epileptic drugs (AEDs) six weeks before I (VF) 
met him. Between our conversations, neurology services had reconsidered his diagnosis, 
whether he had post traumatic epilepsy from a road traffic accident (RTA) and/or whether he 
had suffered a stroke. After being prescribed the AED Tegretol (carbamazepine) his seizures 
lessened considerably and his diagnosis progressed in his medical notes to ‘probable temporal 
lobe epilepsy’. Vince was finally diagnosed with complex partial seizures. Upon meeting me, 
Vince, accompanied by his wife, launched immediately into his own personal embodied 
experiences:   
 
The way it actually happens when—I am talking normally and I still think I 
am talking normally - but I seem as if I'm got lifted up and away and I am 
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looking at ... Yes, you know in a sort of—almost in an empty atmosphere ... 
Because you seem to be lifted as if –the atmosphere that keeps you held down 
... No—it lifts you up and you almost feel as if you're floating ... if you're 
floating then—the normal atmosphere that keeps you held to the  ground ... 
The gravity seems less restricting because you seem to lift up, you can see 
who you're talking to—but even though you can see them, they seem to be a 
long way away, and you know, you sort of come back down and when you 
come back down, you don't really understand what it was ... well it seems that 
where I'm concerned it's this thing where I seem to lift away and, I'm not me. I 
don't know, but I'm looking at the people and even though they haven't 
changed, I seem to have changed. Yeah, when so I come back down, it seems 
... as if it's only natural. Yes, you float away and as you're floating you‘re 
looking—they seemed to have gone further away from you and - you're 
thinking - I can't really say whether the thinking is positive or  negative.  
 
When I asked Vince's wife (who was present in both our interviews) if she agreed with this 
description she responded: “Yes I do really. He does seem to be—away” and turning to 
Vince; “You're in a world of your own.” Disruption in Vince's consciousness is clear as he 
goes into and out of his seizure. In relation to the self-representational theory of 
consciousness described above, Vince demonstrates that he retains a conscious state in that he 
is both self-aware and aware of external stimuli. The complexity and clarity in Vince's 
descriptions of his different levels of awareness illustrates the inadequacy of polarities of 
someone simply thought of as being conscious or unconscious (Gloor, 1986). Vince could not 
articulate his awareness or perform voluntary movements during his seizure, because his 
attention was being diverted inwards, and being taken over by, his epileptic brain activity. A 
person in an epileptic seizure observed by others can be perceived as being completely 
‘unconsciousness’ – as evidenced by Vince’s wife’s comments. However, this may not be 
what the individual experiencing the seizure feels. Their ability to interact is simply 
temporarily suspended and Vince remained very aware of the continuing presence of other 
people even though he could not converse with them. However, notwithstanding his personal 
experience of maintaining an awareness of the presence of others and knowing that others see 
him as being unresponsive, Vince still perceived other people with epilepsy as being 
completely unresponsive:  
 
Cos there are some who just, they have no idea what they do because they totally 
collapse, they are unconscious…Whereas I am still, to a certain extent—conscious in 
that ... if not fully connected, I am conscious about what is happening and to a certain 
extent that, I suppose, is good luck.  
 
Towards the end of the first interview, Vince became vigilant in monitoring his 
thoughts and feelings about his abilities to respond to others and his perceptions shifted 
towards an understanding of how others could perceive him as being unresponsive:   
 
And that is the thing about epilepsy, it is totally unconscious. Even although 
you can see, when you're speaking you know what you are saying - but from 
there to there the translation goes totally different, because you're not saying 
what you're thinking instead of coming out with understandable, 
understandable, words it's coming out [laughs] as absolute rubbish. 
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In terms of the development of a seizure vocabulary, noteworthy was a particular 
linguistic strategy Vince used. His ‘approximations ‘of his experiences are rooted in and are 
simulations of experiences we all have some knowledge of (Gibbs, 2006) and added to our 
understanding of what he was experiencing (Wilde, 2003). These included: “it almost felt as 
if I’d been somewhere else,” “you seem to lift up,” “as if I got lifted up and away,” “almost 
in an empty atmosphere,” “as if—the atmosphere that keeps you held down,” “it lifts you up 
and you almost feel as if you're floating,” “it's this thing where I seem to lift away,” “they 
seemed to have gone further away from you,” and, “I'm not me, I seem to have changed.”  
(Italicised words are those that Vince emphasised). 
 
Drawings: “I'll Let You Try and Work That  Out—Even Though That Looks Like a 
Fish” (Vince) 
 
When I first offered Vince drawing materials, he did not think he could depict his 
seizure in this way:       
It was all—to draw it, all it would be would be a question mark. Yes, a question mark 
– because, it is something I so definitely don't understand so what exactly is 
happening is totally questionable. Yeah, and that is the obvious question mark and to 
say it goes back far as where I had the brain damage in the car accident, yes.  
However, whilst his wife was talking to me about family events, Vince began a 
drawing of his seizure (Figure1) and talked to me as he completed it. In the drawing, Vince 
drew what he thought simply resembled a fish. However, as he continued to draw he began to 
construct his experience. This developed into a description of him entering into, being 
engulfed by, and coming out of, his seizure. Simultaneously he was aware of on-going 
external events he could not attend to.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: ‘I'll let you try and work that out—even though that looks like a fish’ 
 
Vince’s verbatim explanation of his drawing 
 
V:  Do you understand that? (the drawing) 
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VF:  Erm, This is you – one, minute you are there –  
V:  The first I am there, then  I come to there and then I come back coming 
back, coming back, heading back  to where I was before… 
VF:  Where you were before   
V: on level ground and suddenly I seem to be above … 
VF:  Mmm, looking down on people. 
V:  Yes above, almost beyond and then I come back – but exactly what is 
happening during that period is …  
VF:  Is, inside there?  Mmm.  What’s that? 
V:  I’m doing it wrong. 
VF:  Do you want a question mark?   
V:  Yeah 
VF:  It’s like that isn’t it –Yes.   But you don’t know what is happening in that 
space of time 
V:  Yeah, That’s a Spanish question mark –  
V: A Spanish question actually starts before the question and you have that – 
you have – sort of-this. 
VF:  What does that say-double, double? 
V:  You’re doubling, and in, while you’re in, while you're in there is a 
question going in and a question coming back out because they’re unrealised. 
VF:  The questions haven’t been answered – yes. 
V:  Yes, basically (more drawing) 
VF:  Unrealised questions or…..   
V:  Yes. The whole lot there…  
VF:  Mmm, mmm 
V:  …is unrealised – to me.  Other people see it but I don’t.   
VF:  Mmm 
V:  All I see is-sort of coming from there over there and then going back… 
VF:  Going back.  Yeah I understand.  So you could draw it. 
V:  I have been thinking about how to do it.   
 
Vince continued expanding his descriptions after completing the drawing:      
 
The whole circle around that there that's me—questioning going in, questioning 
coming out. But still ... mmm, still unrealised because you don't really feel and if you 
don't really feel, then the realisation is minimal. No the realisation is, if you feel 
exactly what is going on—but you don't, so that makes it unrealised. Well that's 
probably why it's so bloody confusing. You are going in with something and you are 
coming out and other people realise you have gone in—you come out without any real 
realisation.      
 
Vince elegantly articulated levels of awareness never appearing to lose consciousness 
completely as he appeared to be able to access, and constantly reflect on, subjective 
experiences during his seizures whilst simultaneously knowing that he could not respond to 
“exogenous stimuli” (Johanson et al., 2008, p. 170). He described shifts in his conscious 
state, the illusion of being somewhere else but being cognisant that physically, he had 
remained stationary. He describes “autoscopy” (out of body experiences; La France et al., 
2008, p. 318), differences in his self-awareness, visual and auditory illusions/hallucinations 
and self-transformations (Parnas, Handest, Jansson, & Saebye, 2005). Also other 
extraordinary experiences, including visual, auditory, tactile and motor perceptual 
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experiences as well as “coenaesthesias” -which can include migrating sensations, sensations 
of movement, lightness, levitation, elevation, somatic depersonalisation (Vollmer-Larsen, 
Nandest, & Parnas, 2007, p. 346), and mental illusions of derealisation and depersonalisation 
(LaFrance et al., 2008; Wolf, Schöndienst, & Gűlich, 2000).  
For Vince this data appeared to belong to one phenomenological moment, that is, at 
the second interview his previous insights had been forgotten. He continued to ponder on 
whether things still appear to others as they did 18 months earlier, “I'm wondering instead of, 
at a point when I'm talking to them, they hear me talking gibberish” to which his wife replied 
that it did happen now and again. This provided an answer to Vince’s ponderings, “I don't 
really notice it.” Similarly when asked if the drawing remained symbolic of his experiences 
he said, “Well I don't seem to be getting affected the way I was there ... whether that is to do 
with this [pointing to the drawing] I've no idea.” 
At this point, his experiences had reduced into one of simply experiencing a very bad 
headache, and waiting for this to abate,  “No, what seems to happen is that, basically I get 
pretty hot ... yeah, end up with a really stinking headache, which I can't get rid of for at least 
half an hour.” 
Although these descriptions continue to give an idea of what a seizure is like for 
Vince, they did not have the phenomenological quality of his earlier descriptions. The second 
time I (VF) saw Vince and asked him if he had any ideas for questions to ask of other people 
he said, “All I say is please attempt to be totally self-descriptive because doctors can give you 
an idea but the reality must come from the sufferers, because they are the only ones who can 
or cannot.” 
His comments reinforce the importance of subjective experiences in clinical decision 
making (Olsen & Williams, 1985; Tuckett et al., 1985), that both medical and lay voices and 
information are valuable and all need to be considered.   
 
Case 2. Dave 
        
Dave, in his forties, was diagnosed with idiopathic generalised epilepsy (a hereditary 
disposition to seizures, (Baxendale, 2006). His EEG and CT scans were normal and after 
being prescribed the AED Epilim (sodium valproate) his seizures decreased. Following a 
physical assault he did not recall happening, a chip pan fire and a “near miss RTA” facts 
being recorded in his neurology case notes, Dave was then prescribed other medications in 
order to control his seizures. Immediately upon meeting Val, he expressed concern to her 
about the danger he finds himself in because of gaps in his consciousness awareness: “Me 
brain just seems to turn off and I can walk around. I've had smaller episodes like that inside 
me flat where I'm looking at me bedroom wall the next thing I know I'm watching TV with a 
cup of tea in me hand.” He also described times where, “I’m inside me flat, and I remember 
going ‘aah’ and the next thing I can know is, I know, I’m on the floor, and I’ve pissed meself.  
So I’ve struggled to get to bed, and I’ve been in bed.“     
Dave also recalled another incident which had happened in between our two 
conversations, in which he scalded his foot as he poured boiling water over it. His injury did 
not require a skin graft but was obviously painful and not the kind of injury one would want 
to impose upon oneself:       
 
And erm I have scalded myself before, the worse one was ‘erm I found myself 
er trying to make trying to make a cup of tea, er stood up-remember, pouring 
boiling water on me foot, and I’ve got me sock on – right?  And I can see 
myself, actually seeing pouring boiling water on me foot and I can’t, I just 
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cannot move me foot, it’s stuck, it's absolutely stuck... I can’t move me hand, 
can’t move me hand, and I can see the water dripping and I’m thinking to 
myself, move, move, just move.  Then I’m thinking,  if I can just get the sock 
off me foot, then it’ll, it’ll just make it feel better, if I could just get the sock of 
me foot, it’ll make it feel better, And it just will not move…it just slowly 
started moving, just slowly, very, very slowly.      
 
These events assumed more gravity when they began to happen out of doors, Dave 
narrowly missing being killed by an oncoming lorry, having ‘come to’ just in time to avoid 
this. He twice arrived home with planned purchases, not recalling actually buying either of 
them. He described one of these: 
 
So I'd ran through it in me 'ead, what I was gonna do ...  so I've gone onto 
automatic and actually done it. The next thing I remember is being stood on 
the middle of a road looking at a lorry coming towards me. You see, the 
trouble is I've got no memory in the gaps.  I've tried to remember what I did, 
I've zero, zilch. There are only the clues of the potatoes. So I've done 
something, must have done something to there.  
 
Dave was undertaking “complex behaviours without conscious awareness” (Seligman 
& Kirmayer, 2008, p. 48).  He retained “cognitive consciousness” which allowed him to act 
to save his life, and his accounts offer some evidence of him using higher cognitive processes 
during his seizure. At other times, he lacked, temporarily, “phenomenal” consciousness 
(Monaco, Mula, & Cavanna, 2005, p. 156). Dave's experiences of ‘going onto automatic’ are 
similar to these common everyday experiences we all have of walking or driving home 
without an introspective awareness of  the journey (Tye, 2003). These fluctuations in 
everyday conscious experiences can result in “normative dissociative experiences” which can 
happen spontaneously and merely involve “functional shifts in attention and information 
processing” (Seligman & Kirmayer, 2008, p. 34). We can shut out our external environment 
and perceive time as being suspended, (a suspension of self-reflective consciousness) (ibid). 
Some level of consciousness obviously remains however, or accidents would occur (Monaco, 
Mula, & Cavanna, 2005). Everyday dissociative experiences can be pleasurable and 
contribute to enhanced functioning or performance, whereas abnormal ones, such as those 
Dave is experiencing can be associated with “clinically significant distress” (Monaco et al., 
2005, p. 35). Dave perceived his experiences as abnormal and remained perturbed about 
them. 
Dave exhibited components of dissociation which interfere with his normal 
perceptual, cognitive and attentional processing. His memory is disrupted for periods of time; 
he experiences feelings of altered consciousness as being, “in a different world” until 
“somebody breaks that world.” When asked what is happening to him whilst in this state, he 
replied, “I don't know! It's basically [poses as a person having an ‘absence’ seizure, i.e., 
staring and immobile] that's it.” [PC: You feel you can't move?] “Yeah, basically, I'll try 
again [another, similar pose] there you go!” 
He based these poses on a flat mate’s description of what he looked like during these 
times: “I’d go like that, he’d hear me mouth goes (smack smack) or hear me moan or 
something. That’s when he’d say, ‘are you alright?’  I’d go what, what? He just says that I go 
blank- just blank… apparently I just look away.” 
The conversation triggered a memory from Dave’s childhood, to which he added his 
newly acquired knowledge of seizure terminology, in a written postal communication to me; 
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At approximately the same age we had Christmas dinner at me grandparents 
and I must have had what I now know to be a Complex Partial because 
apparently I had a dazed look in me face tried getting into me grandparents gas 
cupboard and had a good chat with no one in particular of which I have no 
memory!  My mother noted later about this period and me she said I just 
suddenly went cold towards her and my memory seemed slightly different. At 
the age of 14-15 I was tearing apart sheets and blankets in my sleep and 
waking up very tired. Doc gave me iron med. 
   
Drawings (1): ‘What It Feels Like In My Brain’ 
 
Following an initial query from Dave: “What do you mean by draw?” Val, “Well, 
whatever you think it feels like, just draw it”, Dave drew two drawings depicting how he 
perceived his brain as working. These helped him expand upon how he felt on occasions 
when he undertakes  behaviours he can neither control nor remember. The first of the two 
individual drawings (Figure 2, drawn in his first conversation with Val) described how he felt 
immediately prior to his near miss RTA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: What it Feels Like in My Brain 
        
The drawing depicts a crowd of people trying to attract Dave’s attention, but he 
(drawn below them) is unable to respond. When asked what this felt like Dave replied:  
 
Rough, er like something's pressing down, pulling down my head or whatever. 
And I can just remember it's like being in a football crowd and everybody's 
screaming at you for attention and you're not able to respond to any of 
em…what it feels like, in my brains, that's a crowd, I'm half awake, half asleep 
and this part (pointing to the front of his head) is where the scream is coming 
from.        
 
Again, considering contributions to a seizure discourse, Dave also uses a particular 
linguistic strategy in his descriptions. “Metaphorical predicates” including “pressing down,” 
“pulling down,” “everybody's screaming at you,” help to express the qualities of things and 
experiences. Words such as “sharp,” “stabbing,” “pointed,” “pinched,” “lightening,” 
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“cutting,” “dull,” “burning,” “searing,” “gnawing,” “convulsive,” “tickling,” “prickling,” 
“electric,” and “pressing down” are other examples of words which could be valuable for 
people. They add depth to the meanings of experiences without a person having to formulate 
more complex metaphors (Menz, Lalouschek, Reisigl, Sator, & Frickey, 2005).  
Dave appears to exhibit what could be seen as components of dissociation (i.e., an 
interference with his normal perceptual, cognitive and attentional processes), his memory is 
disrupted for periods of time.  He has feelings of altered consciousness and of being, “in a 
different world. ” However, he can become aware of other people around, all of a sudden 
somebody can break into this world, “Are you alright? Really, are you alright? ”  
When asked about his awareness of this other world he described it as feeling like: 
 
It's like a daisy dream world ... it's like a black hole, if you went into a black 
hole, time and space gets squashed, everything's starting to slooow down, 
that's how it feels ... My mind just tried to blank it out. 
 
Drawing (3): Divide My Head Into Quarters 
       
Early in our second conversation, Dave explained through another drawing (Figure 3) 
two distinct elements of his seizure experiences. One was how he perceived his brain as 
working and the other was how this affected him emotionally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Divide My Head Into Quarters  
 
The first element is related to the physical attributes of his seizures: 
 
Divide my head into quarters. That's me front [front of head depicted with 
letter “F”] that's me right I get headaches there, I get headaches roundabout 
that area and that area [areas marked with a black/grey scribbles] these are 
intensities, like the darker it is, the more intense the pain can be.  It doesn't 
mean that it is going to be that intense, but that's how it can be intense.  Er, er 
and there ... Headaches and pains, that there could be lower back, sort of there 
[indicates the back of his neck] this part, this part here, there, seems to be the 
only part of my head that seems to be unaffected [the empty quartile in his 
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drawing].’ That seems to the only part of my head that seems to be unaffected, 
there—seems to feel? Seem to have something at the time. 
 
The second element was his negative perceptions of his brain function, and his feeling 
that there was some lessening of his cognitive abilities.  He described how this felt:  
 
I think I'd be oh, oh sort of erm … more stupider erm, that's sort of—one quart 
less intelligent. Yeah—one quart less intelligent’ (the aforementioned empty 
quartile in his drawing). There's a D***** inside that's always screaming to be 
let out no, the good one. 
        
In Dave’s second conversation with me, his attitude had shifted towards his seizures 
beginning with frustration that these events happen to him and pose a grave danger, to 
accepting that he can do nothing about them and with the knowledge that his cognitive 
abilities were temporarily, severely compromised, to finally attempting to disassociate from 
this part of himself:  
 
I don't want to know it, I don't want to know it the thing that I've just, I don't 
want to know. In general I don't want to know it. Oh yes I do stupid things, I 
know I do stupid things. I don't want to know it, coconuts I don't wanna know 
that I done the coconut things, I don't want to know I've walked across the 
road that I could have killed myself, I don't want to know.  
 
Vince, Dave too dismissed the relevance of this drawing when asked about it at his 
second interview saying that he did not feel this anymore, putting it down to the side effects 
of medication. 
 
Discussion  
        
We have offered a trail of evidence suggesting the value of drawings in elaborating 
seizure consciousness in an IPA. Some of Reuber and Kurthen’s (2011) concerns have been 
addressed. An IPA is useful for exploring the phenomenological quality of seizures and doing 
this is not methodologically impossible. An IPA offers some idea of what seizure 
consciousness consists of, it illustrated the vividness of the men’s accounts and that things are 
not always what they seem to in terms of people’s apparent awareness/unawareness. The IPA 
given the method’s focus on cognition also identified times at which Vince and Dave used 
access consciousness and the phenomenological component of the method obviously holds 
potential in this area of work. Vince and Dave described their conscious experiences as both 
experts (in their seizure experiences) and novices (in seizure langauage). Bodily experiences 
can shape participants' narratives (Öhlen, 2003) and most striking was the complexity and 
insightfulness of Vince's initial descriptions contrasted with later ones. Initially, he described 
his seizure experiences using language which facilitated powerful images of his cognitive 
functioning during a seizure. He articulated cognitive and affective reactions to bodily and 
visual sensations and also complex alterations in his levels of consciousness. Talking to me 
and being able to draw his seizure facilitated Vince in reaching this awareness over time. He 
demonstrated that he knew when he moved from being able to communicate with others, to a 
complete inability to do this. He offered complex linguistic reconstructions which illustrated 
Furchner’s seminal concept of a shift from “dynamic to static” state (Furchner, 2002) a 
central feature in the accounts of people with epilepsy. He also became aware of how difficult 
it was for others to understand the subjective nature of his experiences.  
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Similarly, in an amalgam of lay and medical terminology Dave described how 
experiences consisting of modality specific sensations, auditory and anomalous visual 
perceptions and different levels of awareness and unawareness felt to him. His drawings 
communicated further his experiences and his narrative was coloured with his own 
idiosyncratic terminology including symptoms he described as‚ “hot poker,” “a needle stuck 
in the foot,” “day dreams and weird worlds.“ Dave's experiences contained instances of him 
retaining some “cognitive consciousness” allowing him to act to save his life, others illustrate 
his “phenomenal consciousness.” Dave's seizures were observed occasionally by friends and 
once by a clinic nurse corroborating his descriptions. 
Creating the drawings facilitated “a special conversation” between participants and 
Val and ‘complex interview interactions’ whereby participants explored and expanded upon 
details, meanings and connections as they interpreted their work (Esin & Squire, 2013, 
paragraph 2).  The drawings succeeded in turning the conversations (Roberts, 2008) into ones 
in which Vince and Dave offered their unique, linguistic contributions as well as insights into 
their multiple, temporal experiences all breathing life into the data (Glass, 2008). In terms of 
managing their condition, the drawings offered information about their seizures, information 
about themselves, their day to day lives and the resources they had to manage their conditions 
(Gillies et al., 2005). Interpreting visual representations of people experiencing seizures has 
not been done to date in an IPA and more work is needed with both epilepsy and NES 
patients with a view to exploring the differential diagnosis of both types of seizures.  
Introducing patients’ drawings into the health community (Glass, 2008) could offer 
alternative perspectives and interpretations of their situations (Battisti & Eiselen, 2008) and 
could add value to time limited clinical conversations. Art used in psychoanalytic therapy for 
example, has helped illustrate coping skills and strategies of people with seizures (Cregeen, 
1996). 
Vince and Dave’s verbal contributions and their drawings illustrate that complex 
descriptions of seizures and consciousness are available and could be ‘accumulated’. In terms 
of how the men’s experiences reflect back onto neurological data these descriptions could 
potentially,  
 
1) contribute towards diagnostic specific seizure discourses and 
2) be combined with objective measurements such as EEG, brain imaging 
and behaviour  
 
In terms of (1), given the lack of knowledge about subjective seizure experiences of 
consciousness and a lack of a consciousness discourse, building up a corpus of data from an 
IPA would be valuable. Vince himself advocated the value of a lay addition to this discourse 
- a factor also recognized in the CA work (Gülich, 2003; Schwabe, Howell, & Reuber, 2007). 
Although Vince and Dave articulated their experiences well, the lack of an available seizure 
vocabulary may inhibit others in describing these phenomena. Val not being a 
neurologist may also have elicited data which were removed from definitions of 
consciousness rooted in epileptology.   
Most importantly for us was that capturing Vince and Dave’s descriptions and 
drawings early mitigated against the loss/disappearance of their phenomenological 
experiences over time. This being an issue to consider because medication and familiarity 
with seizure language can alter patients’ perceptions of their experiences. The following 
paragraph outlines the potential of (2) that is, the potential combination of phenomenological 
and neurological data. 
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Future Work: Combining Participants’ Drawings of Seizure Consciousness with Neuro-
Phenomenology  
        
Neuro-phenomenological techniques (described briefly below) facilitate the detection 
of deep experiential structures. Uncovering these structures could present us with ‘a rich and 
largely unexplored source of information and data with dramatic consequences’ (Varela & 
Shear, 1999, as cited in Petitmengin, 2009, p. 9; see also Landridge, 2007). Neuro-
phenomenology utilises the ideas of systems theory and that, in terms of epileptic seizures, 
these are not a sudden and unexpected occurrences but one which can be anticipated being 
the result of a elements of a system and “its general (spatial and temporal) dynamics” 
(Petitmengin et al., 2007, p. 747).  That is, seizure onset is seen as an on-going, dynamic 
process which can begin days, hours or minutes beforehand (Petitmengin et al., 2007).  It 
follows that the subjective cognitive experiences of epileptic seizures also unfolds and this 
takes time to become aware of as happening and, subsequently, to describe (Petitmengin, 
2006, p. 230). 
Brain patterns are known to be related to people’s “subjective states” (Petitmengin, 
2006, p 125), descriptions being correlated with “neuronal dynamics of the electro-clinical 
onset of a seizure” (Petitmengin, 2006, p. 124). In terms of 2) above, these subjective 
experiences represent first person direct descriptions of cognitive processes which can help 
with the interpretation of other data such as that being recorded with neuroimaging 
techniques and could form the basis of new “paradigm for a neuro-scientific approach to 
epilepsy” (Johanson et al., 2008, p. 171). Potentially these could harbour the possibility of 
differentiating these from NES.  Generating a large corpus of data has the potential to be 
translated into concrete, practical ideas as heuristics, concepts or principles, which could 
inform the neurosciences, moving towards an “objective interpretational empirical 
framework” (Gallagher & Sørensen, 2006, p. 131). IPA studies for example, have the 
potential to help develop theory through a process of “analytic induction” (Smith, 1999, p. 
413), Neuro-phenomenology could then form an integral element of multi-method 
interdisciplinary approaches. There are however, issues to consider when exploring 
consciousness further and the task of knowing and describing subjective experiences is not an 
easy one for people because they can perceive phenomena pre reflectively without being 
consciously aware of this. To develop descriptions requires a phenomenological reduction 
and a direction of attention exclusively to one’s own personal experience of the world, 
putting aside other ideas, beliefs or theories about that experience (Gallagher & Sørensen, 
2006). Thus, there is also the potential for participants as well as researchers, to be trained in 
such methods (Finlay, 2008; Varela, 1996). This would facilitate the knowing of experiences 
and offer findings that are even more “experience-close” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 204).     
 
Neuro-phenomenological Elicitation Interview Techniques 
 
The process of becoming aware of one‘s pre reflective experiences consists of coming 
into closer contact with something that was previously unknown. Describing these can be 
facilitated at two levels; the level of experience, and at the level of becoming aware of the 
how of this experience (Petitmengin, 2009). The how can be reached by incorporating 
interview techniques which access the “pre-reflective micro-structure” of subjective 
processes (Petitmengin et al., 2007, p. 746). Elicitation interview techniques (Petitmengin, 
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2009) facilitate a finely detailed and guided exploration of important elements of people’s 
recent experiences so that they can become aware of pre reflexive processes and develop their 
phenomenological descriptions of these (Gallagher & Sørensen, 2006). These techniques-
much like Wundt’s participants in his experiments on introspection in the 19th century and  
who were asked to describe the “pure” perceptions as they appeared in ‘their consciousness, 
(Gallagher & Sørensen, 2006) render the descriptions of lived experience reproducible thus 
offering scientific validity (Petitmengin, 2009). Memories, images, sensations, sounds and 
the fragmentation of the temporal course of an experience all have the potential to be evoked 
by an elicitation interview. The participant relives the experience, their attention being 
directed towards visual, kinaesthetic, auditory or olfactory triggers, felt emotions or internal 
dialogues, all of which may have been pre-reflective until expertly elicited and brought into 
consciousness. 
The alliance of IPA with neurology has already been mooted (Smith et al., 2009) and 
phenomenological methods have already been assimilated into empirical studies exploring 
patients’ experiences of epileptic seizures (Le Van Quyen & Petitmengin, 2002; Petitmengin 
et al., 2007). However, there is the question of whether the close focus integral to neuro-
phenomenological techniques and methods fit into the current spirit of IPA.  Although some 
argue that accessing pre-reflective conscious experiences could sit well with IPA (Landridge, 
2007; Willig, 2001) this explicit focus would go beyond its boundaries as they stand today.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Our study has demonstrated for the first time how an IPA of participant drawings has 
generated in-depth, first person embodied descriptions of seizure consciousness. The 
approach has the theoretical and methodological potential to uncover conceptualizations of 
seizure experiences previously unheard. This work formed the basis for our ideas for using 
neuro-phenomenological interview methods and techniques to explore seizure consciousness 
with participants’ articulations about their drawings. . If it is the case that self-expression 
through various forms of art is an underused tool in neurology (Stafstrom, 2005) we suggest 
that this could add significantly to work in the field. 
All of this indicates the usefulness of a paradigm shift in seizure exploration in terms 
of locating new vistas to explore. 
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